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A-B-C, SEE YOU REAL SOON:
BROADCAST MEDIA MERGERS AND
ENSURING A "DIVERSITY OF VOICES"
INTRODUCTION
On July 31, 1995, Michael D. Eisner, the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Walt Disney Company ("Disney") and Thomas
S. Murphy, the chairman of Capital Cities/ABC ("ABC"), announced
the proposed acquisition of ABC by Disney for $19 billion) The fol-
lowing day, Laurence A. Tisch, chief executive officer of CBS Incorpo-
rated ("CBS"), announced the sale of CBS to the Westinghouse Electric
Corporation ("Westinghouse") for $5.4 billion. 2
 The National Broad-
casting Company ("NBC") is a subsidiary of the General Electric Cor-
poration ("GE"), and the Fox Broadcasting Company ("Fox") is a
division of the Australian-based communications giant News Corpora-
tion Limited ("News Corporation"). 3
 The consummation of the ABC/Dis-
ney and CBS/Westinghouse mergers resulted in the ownership of all
four major networks by large corporations. 4
Beyond the jokes about whether Peter Jennings will don mouse
ears for his nightly broadcasts or whether Snow White will replace
Barbara Walters as the co-host of 20/20, the proposed mergers raise
serious questions about access to information in an age of massive
media conglomerates. 5
 After all, if, as the ABC promotion says, "More
Americans get their news from ABC News than from any other news
source," what will be the impact on a well-informed public if that news
is coming from the mouthpiece of a corporation with worldwide op-
' See Geraldine Fabrikant, Walt Disney to Acquire ABC in $19 Billion Deal to Build a Giant for
Entertainment, N.Y. 'rimes, Aug. 1, 1995, at Al. The merger was consummated on February 9,
1996. See Disney Closes Acquisition, SignaLs Interest in Another, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at B3.
2 See Judith H. Dobrzynski and Geraldine Fabrikant, Tisch's Legacy: Healthy Profit, Ailing
Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at Al. Westinghouse completed the acquisition on November
24, 1995. See Albert R. Karr, FCC Cleats Westinghouse Bid for CBS, Settling Dispute on Children's
Programs., WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1995, at 115; Westinghouse Corp.: CBS Purchase Completed in $5.4
Billion Agreement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1995, at B3.
5
 See Hoover's Company Profile Database—American Public Companies, available in LEXIS,
Company Library, Hoover File [hereinafter Hoover—American]; Hoover's Company Profile Data-
base—World Companies, available in LEXIS, Company Library, Hoover File [hereinafter Hoover—
World].
4 See Hoover—American, supra note 3; Hoover—World, supra note 3.
5 See Daniel Pearl, Media Consolidation Has Left and Right Worried About Big Firms Gaining
a Lock on Information, WALL ST. j., Aug. 31, 1995, at A10.
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erations? Although none of the partnerships creates a company that
has a sufficiently large share of any market to raise traditional eco-
nomic antitrust concerns, they do raise questions about the ability of
the American people to hear from a diversity of voices. 6 Representative
Edward Markey of Massachusetts articulated this concern about the
increasing concentration of media ownership when he stated that,
although he saw nothing wrong with the merger of ABC and Disney,
increasing concentration of media ownership would be "troubling."7
Markey expressed his fear that mergers "could potentially collapse the
diversity of voices which we have in America into the control of a .. .
small number of hands."'
When these proposed mega-mergers are announced, can the Gov-
ernment intervene? And if it can, should it intervene? This Note
examines these questions and concludes that, although it may be in
the public's interest for the Government to intervene, the Govern-
ment, under the current regulatory scheme, probably will not do so.
Section I surveys the parties who are involved in such mergers: the
networks, their corporate partners and the governmental agencies
charged with regulating television broadcasting. 9 Section II discusses
the competing societal interests of governmental noninterference with
free speech and the ensurance of a diversity of voices." ) Section III
examines the ability of the governmental agencies to structure a pro-
posed merger before it is approved." Section IV examines how those
same agencies might regulate the resulting media conglomerates after
the merger has been approved.' 2 Finally, section V proposes some
changes in the current regulatory structure that would further the
public's interest in maintaining a diversity of media voices.' 3
6 See id.
7 See ABC News Nightline: Disney, ABC Merge (ABC television broadcast, July 31, 1995)
(transcript on file with the Boston College Law Review) [hereinafter Nightline]. Markey sits on the
Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee. See jou, r
COMM. ON PRINTING, 1995-1996 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 104TH CONGRESS, S. PUB.
No. 104-14, at 395-96 (1995).
Nightline, supra note 7.
9 See infra notes 14-135 and accompanying text.
ID See infra notes 136-274 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 275-304 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 305-34 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 335-80 and accompanying text.
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I. THE PLAYERS
A. The Networks and Their Corporate Partners
1. Basic Terminology
A television network provides programming services to individual
broadcast stations." Until 1996, networks, like any other party, were
limited in the number of stations they could own nationwide.'5 The
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")' 6 permitted the net-
works to own up to fourteen television stations provided at least two
were controlled by racial minorities." In the absence of minority con-
trol, a broadcaster could own up to twelve television stations.IN Addi-
tionally, FCC regulations limited the audience that any given owner
could reach.'" A single owner could not control television stations that
reached more than twenty-five percent of the national audience (or
thirty percent if at least five percent of the stations were minority-con-
trolled). 20 The FCC also prohibited ownership of more than one tele-
14 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3613(a) (1) (1995). Section 73.3613(a) (1) defines a network as
any person, entity, or corporation which offers an interconnected program service
on a regular basis for 15 or more hours per week to at least 25 affiliated television
licensees in 10 or more states; and/or any person, entity, or corporation controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with such person, entity, or corporation.
Id,
15 See id. § 73.3555(c)(1). Network ownership should be distinguished from network affilia
ticrn. See STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION 50 (1984); RoBERT M. AND
MAXINE K. REED, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION, CABLE, AND VIDEO 14-15 (1992). Network
ownership entails actual ownership of the individual station by the network company. See id. A
network affiliate is an independent broadcast station that forms an agreement with a network
company. See H. Under this agreement, the network provides programming and cash to the
affiliate. See BESEN, supra, at 50; REED, supra, at 15. In return, the affiliate permits the network
to sell advertising time within the programs and retain the resulting revenues. See BESEN, supra,
at 50. Additionally, the affiliate airs local advertising and retains the revenues from those sales.
See id. at 51. In general, for programs of one-half hour, the network retains control of all
advertising time within the program, and the affiliate sells advertising time between programs,
See id. For longer programs, the affiliate also retains advertising time within the program. See id.
16
 For a discussion of the FCC and its powers, see infra notes 47-81, 2711-96, 308-28 and
accompanying text.
17 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1) (ii)-(iii).
18 See id. § 73.3555(e) (1) (iii).
19 See id. § 73.3555(e) (2).
20 See id. As of October 1995, ABC owned eight television stations and had purchases pending
for two additional stations, reaching 23.62% of the U.S. market; NBC owned nine stations
reaching 22.92% of the U.S. market; CBS owned seven stations reaching 18.68% of the U.S.
market; and Fox owned eleven stations reaching 24.7% of the U.S. market. See Joe Flint et al.,
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vision station in the same broadcast area." Finally, the FCC did not
allow a party to own a radio or television station in a community in
which that party already owned or operated a daily newspaper.22
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ( -Telecommunications Act") 23
changed these limitations. 24
 First, the Telecommunications Act instructed
the FCC to eliminate restrictions on the number of television stations
that a party may own nationwide.25
 Second, the Telecommunications
Act increased the reach limitation for any given owner to thirty-five
percent. 26
 Third, the Telecommunications Act instructed the FCC to
conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether its restriction
on local ownership to one station was necessary. 27 Although the Tele-
communications Act does not address the FCC ownership rules pro-
hibiting cross-ownership of stations and newspapers, members of the
FCC indicated the possibility that the FCC would lift those restrictions
as well. 28
2. The Big Four Networks
The major television networks in the United States are ABC, CBS,
NBC and Fox. 29 The networks are owned by, respectively, Walt Disney,
Westinghouse, GE and News Corporation." The resulting partnerships
have placed numerous media and business interests in the hands of a
few individuals. 3 '
a. ABC/Walt Disney
ABC and Walt Disney's merger placed a huge number of media
outlets under the umbrella of one corporate entity. 32
 In addition to its
Special Supplement to Variety, VARIETY, Oct. 23-Oct. 29, 1995, available in LEX1S, News Library,
Papers File [hereinafter VARIETY]. Group W, a division of Westinghouse, owned eight stations
reaching 12.85% of the U.S. market. See id,
21 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(6); MORTON 1. HAMBURG & STUART N. BROTMAN, COMMUNICA-
TIONS LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3.03(3] [a] (1995).
22 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d); HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 3.03[3] [a].
° Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56.
24 Id. § 202.
25 1d. § 202(c) (1) (A).
26 1d. § 202(c)(1)(B).
27 1d. § 202(c) (2).
23 SeeAlbert R. Karr & Thomas It King, FCC May This Out Rules on Owning Competing Media,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 9, 1996, at B13.
29 See REED, supra note 15, at 385-86.
3° See Hoover—American, supra note 3; Hoover—World, supra note 3.
31 See Hoover—American, supra note 3; Hoover—World, supra note 3.
32
 See Hoover—American, supra note 3.
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eight television stations, ABC owns ABC Radio Networks (including
eleven AM and ten FM radio stations), 80% of cable network ESPN,
50% of the Lifetime Television cable network, 37.5% of the cable Arts
and Entertainment Network ("A&E") and daily newspapers including
the Fort Worth Star-Telegram and The Kansas City (Missouri) Star." In
1994, ABC had affiliation agreements with 225 television stations that
reached 99.9% of all households in the United States. 34 Walt Disney,
which acquired ABC in February 1996, has varied ownership interests:
theme parks (ownership of Disneyland, Walt Disney World and Epcot
Center, part-ownership of Euro Disney, interest in Tokyo Disneyland);
television production (Buena Vista, Touchstone and Walt Disney Tele-
vision); film production (Hollywood, Touchstone and Walt Disney Pic-
tures); film distribution (Miramax Film Corporation); the cable Disney
Channel; video distribution (Buena Vista Home Video); Hollywood
and Walt Disney Records; the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim ice hockey
team; the Disney Stores; and Hyperion Press."
b. CBS/Westinghouse
CBS and Westinghouse's merger created a large organization with
interests in numerous industries." In addition to its seven television
stations, CBS owns the CBS Radio Station Group (including eight AM
and thirteen FM radio stations), CBS Entertainment (TV program-
ming) and fifty percent of CBS Video (videocassette distribution)."
33 See id. In order to gain FCC approval of the ABC/Disney merger, Disney agreed to sell,
within one year, either ABC-owned newspaper or radio interests in Detroit and Fort Worth. See
FCC ()Ks Disney-Gap Cities Deal, MEDIA DAILY, Feb. 8, 1996, available in Westlaw, News/Topical
News Library, Broadcasting Media File. ABC owned the Fort Worth Star-Telegram and the Oakland
Press (Pontiac, Mich.) and two radio stations in each of those areas. See id. The FCC had allowed
ABC to retain both newspaper and radio outlets because ABC owned them prior to the promul-
gation of the cross-ownership regulations and the properties were grandfathered. See id. Disney
was not entitled to such grandl'athered status. See id. As the FCC gave Disney one year in which
to sell the properties, Eisner expressed hope that Disney would be able to retain the newspapers
if the FCC lifted cross-ownership restrictions. See id.; Karr & King, supra note 28, at 1313.
31 See Hoover
—American, supra note 3.
35 See id. In order to gain approval for the merger from the Department of justice, see infra
note 130-35 and accompanying text, Disney agreed to sell Los Angeles television station KCAL.
See Thomas R. King & Bryan Cruley, Disney is Cleared fry Justice Agency on Cap Cities Deal, WALL
Sr. j., jam 17, 1996, at 139. Disney was responding to an investigation by the Department ofJustice
as to whether the ownership of both KCAL and ABC's Los Angeles KABC would "'reduce
competition and raise the price of advertising' in Los Angeles." See id. Rather than wait for a
decision, Disney announced its intention to sell KCAL. See id. The FCC also based its approval
for the merger on the sale of KCAL. See Karr & King, supra note 28, at B13.
srs See Hoover—American, supra note 3.
97 See id.
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CBS also has affiliation agreements with 206 television stations. 38
 West-
inghouse owns subsidiaries Aptus, Incorporated (environmental serv-
ices), Electronic Systems (advanced electronics), Energy Systems (waste-
to-energy projects), Thermo King Corporation (refrigerated transport),
WC1 Communities, Incorporated (real estate development) and West-
inghouse Broadcasting Company (broadcasting), which owns eight
television stations. 39
c. NBC/General Electric
GE acquired NBC in 1986 as part of a $6.4 billion deal in which
it bought Radio Corporation of America ("RCA"), which owned NBC.4"
In addition to its nine NBC-owned television stations, GE owns the
CNBC cable network, interests in seventeen other cable channels in
the United States (including A&E, Court TV, American Movie Classics,
Bravo and the History Channel) and cable channels in Europe and
Asia.4 ' GE also produces aircraft engines and replacement parts, kitchen
and laundry appliances, industrial products and systems, materials
(such as plastics, silicones, laminates and abrasives) and technical
products and services (such as medical and network-based information
services) . 42
d. Fox/News Corporation Limited
Fox is a division of the Australia-based communications giant News
Corporation. 45 Run by media mogul Rupert Murdoch, News Corpora-
tion is the world's largest newspaper publisher. 44 In addition to its own
eleven television stations, the Fox division of News Corporation has
contracts with 139 affiliates throughout the United States: 13 News Cor-
poration also has interests in newspapers in Australia (The Australian
and 100 other Australian newspapers), New Zealand (Independent
Newspapers), the United Kingdom (The Times and four other newspa-
pers) and the United States (New York Post); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corporation; British Sky Broadcasting; the Asian satellite network
" See id.
32 See id.; VARIETY, supra note 20.
4°
 See Hoover—American, supra note 3.
41 See Bill Carter, Broadcast Networks Come Back Strong: An Old Medium Holds New Luster for
Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at 01.
42 See. Hoover—American, supra note 3.
43 See. Hoover—World, supra note 3.
44 See id,
1 ." See id.
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Star Television; magazines TV Guide and Mirabella; and HarperCollins
Publishers. 46
B. The Federal Communications Commission
1. Origins
The Government's involvement in the communications industry
has its roots in the nature of the broadcast spectrum. Radio and
television operate by transmitting and receiving messages along fre-
quencies of the electromagnetic spectrum. 47
 One problem facing the
broadcast industry is that when two transmitters use the same fre-
quency, a receiver capable of receiving both transmitters will hear
neither clearly. 48 In order to prevent interference on the broadcast
spectrum, the Government has long been involved in the regulation
of telecommunications." The United States first regulated radio trans-
mission in the Wireless Ship Act of 1910." This act required any
steamer that could carry fifty or more persons to be equipped with
radio apparatus and skilled personnel to operate the equipment. 51 By
1912, ship-to-shore communication encountered significant interfer-
ence; thus, the armed services began to demand regulation of the
broadcast spectrum. 52
 The April 1912 sinking of the Titanic and the
resulting revelations that radio had been instrumental in assisting
survivors further prompted an outcry for regulation of the airwaves."
Additionally, the United States, as a signatory to the first international
radio treaty, negotiated in 1912, was obliged to conform to treaty
regulations to further wireless conformity and compatibility." In re-
sponse to these developments, Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1912
("1912 Radio Act"). 55 The 1912 Radio Act required broadcasters to
46 See id.
17 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELF.COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 3 (1994).
48 See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 2.06[1] [a].
49
 For a good discussion of the history of the regulation of the broadcast spectrum, see
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 (1943).
r° See Act of June 24, 1910, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (requiring apparatus and operators for radio
communication on certain ships); JOHN R. BI7TNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 20 (2d ed. 1994); HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01 [2] [a].
51 36 Stat. at 629-30.
"See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01 [2] [a]; KRATTENMAKER, supra note 47, at 3.
"See BITTNER, supra note 50, at 20; KRATTENMAKER, StipTa note 47, at 3.
54
	 ROBERT L. HILLIARD, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: A PRIMER 61
(1991).
" Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch, 287, 37 Stat. 302 (regulating radio communications); see HAM-
BURG BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01(2] [a]; KRATTENMAKER, supra note 47, at 3-4.
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obtain licenses and forbade the operation of radio equipment without
a license but did not set aside frequencies for private broadcast." At
the time, such an allocation was unnecessary, as there were sufficient
frequencies for all broadcasters who wanted to be on the air."
World War I accelerated the use of radio, and in the early 1920s
there was a rapid increase in the number of radio stations broadcasting
and, subsequently, in the amount of interference along the radio
spectrum." In an attempt to decrease interference caused by the large
number of stations sending out competing signals, the Government,
through the Department of Commerce, limited the number of license
applications it processed." The Secretary of Commerce also estab-
lished a policy of requiring broadcasters to share frequencies."
In 1926, in United States v. Zenith Radio corp., however, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
although the 1912 Radio Act required the Secretary of Commerce to
issue broadcast licenses, the Secretary did not have the authority to
impose any additional restrictions such as those relating to broadcast
frequency or hours of operation. 61 In Zenith, the Secretary of Com-
merce charged that the Zenith Radio Corporation ("ZRC") operated
radio apparatus in violation of the terms of its license. 62 Specifically,
the Secretary alleged that ZRC operated its station on a wavelength
and at times not authorized by the license." The court reasoned that
the terms of the 1912 Radio Act did not empower the Secretary to
regulate the hours in which a broadcaster could operate because the
statute did not provide the Secretary an adequate standard by which
he could make that regulation. 64 The court thus held that the Com-
merce Secretary's imposition of the frequency and hours regulations
exceeded his authority under the 1912 Radio Act."
Rather than appeal the Zenith decision, the Secretary of Com-
merce, Herbert Hoover, sought an opinion from Acting Attorney Gen-
eral William Donovan interpreting the 1912 Radio Act. 66 On July 8,
56 37 Stat. at 302-08; HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01 [2] ta].
57 See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01 [2] [a].
" See id. § 1.01[3] [a].
59 See KRATTENMAKER, supra note 47, at 4-5.
6° See id. at 5.
GI 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. III. 1926); see HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01[3] [b].
6'2 12 F.2d at 615.
53 See id. at 617.
" Id. at 618.
"id. at 617-18.
'' See BUTTNER, supra note 50, at 24; HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01 [3] [b];
KRATTENMAKER, supra note 47, at 7.
May 1997]	 MEDIA MERGERS
	 505
1926, Donovan issued an opinion stating that the Zenith decision re-
garding the scope of the 1912 Radio Act was correct.° The next day,
Hoover urged broadcasters to exercise self-restraint so as to avoid
broadcast interference. 68
 The result was chaos, with so many broadcast-
ers transmitting on the same frequency that stations could not be
heard.°
Responding to this chaos, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927
("1927 Radio Act"). 7° The 1927 Radio Act was broader than its 1912
predecessor, allowing for regulation of programming and licensing
rather than merely aiming at controlling interference. 7 ' The 1927
Radio Act made it clear that the airwaves could only be used with the
Government's permission. 72 Consequently, the 1927 Radio Act also
established the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC") and charged it with
allocating frequencies among applicants in consideration of the "pub-
lic convenience, interest, or necessity.""
In 1934, Congress recognized broad support for a body with stronger
authority to regulate the means of all foreign and interstate commu-
nications including radio, telegraph and any other new technologies
that might develop. 74 Congress thus enacted the Communications Act
of 1934 ("Communications Act")." The Communications Act estab-
lished the FCC." In broad terms, the Communications Act charged the
FCC with regulating all interstate radio and wire communications."
67 See 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926).
68 See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.01131 [b].
69 See HAMBURG Se BROTMAN, SUpra note 21, § 1.01131 [c]; KRATTENMAKER, Mtpra note 47, at 7.
"Radio Act of' 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1 162; see HAMKURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21,
§ 1.01 [3] [a]; HILLIMM„supra note 54, at 64; KRATTENMAKER, supra note 47, at 7.
71 44 Stat. at 1162.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1162-63. Congressman White (R-Me.), a sponsor of the 1927 Radio Act, stated:
[I]n the present state of scientific development there must be a limitation upon
the number of broadcasting stations and ... licenses should be issued only to those
stations whose operation would render a benefit to the public, are necessary in the
public interest, or would contribute to the development of the art. . . . We have
written it into the bill. If enacted into law, the broadcasting privilege will not be a
right of selfishness. It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to he served.
See 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926).
74 See B1TTNER, .supra note 50, at 30; HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 1.02.
75 47 U.S.C. § 151-613 (1988).
76 	§ 151.
77 Id. Section 151 of the Communications Act states:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio com-
munication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose
of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property
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2. Basis of FCC Authority: "Public Convenience, Interest, or
Necessity"
The FCC acts as a public trustee, issuing licenses to broadcasters
in exchange for the broadcasters' promise to serve the public interest. 78
The basis of the FCC's authority lies in its mandate to provide for the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity."79 The Communications Act
gives the FCC wide discretion in defining the public interest, and the
FCC has consistently rejected calls to adopt concrete standards defin-
ing the public interest. 80 The FCC has, however, consistently acted on
the theory that diversification of mass media ownership serves the
public interest by promoting diversity of program and service view-
poin ts. 8
through the use of wire and radio communications, and for the purpose of secur-
ing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore
granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect
to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is
created a commission to be known as the "Federal Communications Commission,"
which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and
enforce the provisions of this chapter.
Id. Although the Communications Act does not refer to television, it has been consistently
interpreted to apply to television as well as radio. See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
78 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3591(a) (4) (1995); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969); HAMBURG & BROTMAN, sutrra note 21, § 1.01 [4]. Section 307(a) of the
Communications Act states "The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby, subject to the limitations of this chapter, shall grant to any applicant therefor a
station license provided for by this chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a).
Section 309(a) of the Communications Act states the following:
(a) Considerations in granting application
Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission shall determine, in the
case of each application filed with it ... , whether the public interest, convenience,
and necessity will be served by the granting of such application, and, if the Com-
mission, upon examination of such application and upon consideration of such
other matters as the Commission may officially notice, shall find that public interest,
convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall grant
such application.
Id. § 309(a).
7s
	 47 U.S.C. § 303. Section 303 provides an inventory of the FCC's powers, all of which
are to be exercised within the context of safeguarding the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity." Id.
s° See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 2.01 [2] [b]; see also Rainbow Broad. Co. v. FCC,
949 F.2d 405, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court has validated broad parameters within
which the FCC may further its view of the public interest without interference from the courts.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress delegated to the FCC the task of making the initial
determination of how its policies may best serve the public." (citations omitted)).
81 See HAMBURG. & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 3.03.
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C. The Federal Trade Commission
1. Origins
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act to ensure competition
in the marketplace." Congress enacted the Sherman Act because of its
concern that a few corporations were concentrating economic power
and that those corporations could use this excessive power to oppress
individuals and injure the public generally." In order to prevent such
oppression, the Sherman Act prohibited monopolies and attempts to
monopolize business in restraint of trade." Between 1890 and 1914,
enforcement of the Sherman Act was lax due to its vague wording, a
judiciary committed to free market economics, an unconcerned Presi-
dency and a Congress that did not provide the administrative mecha-
nism to enforce the statute." At the same time, there was growing
public concern about the emergence of large business combinations
in the United States." As a result, Congress attacked the antitrust
problem on two fronts." First, Congress passed a statute, the Clayton
Act, to supplement the Sherman Act. 88
 Unlike the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act did not prohibit general practices." Rather, it prohibited
specific business activities such as price discrimination, exclusive deal-
ing and interlocking directorates.' Second, Congress created an ad-
ministrative agency empowered to enforce the Sherman Act, the Clay-
ton Act and the agency's own enabling statute.91
 To that end, Congress
passed the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") which estab-
lished the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). 92
"See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); Thomas V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BAstcs § 1.01 (1995).
Section I declares that "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ...
is declared to be illegal." IS U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States ... ." Id. g 2.
83
 See VAKERICS, supra note 82, § 1.01.
84 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2; VAxEttics„supra note 82, § 1.01.
86
 See STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 3.02 (1995); PETER C. WARD,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.01 (1992).
86 See WARD, supra note 85, § 1.01,
87 See KANWIT, supra note 85, § 3.02.
8.9 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994); KANWIT, supra note 85, § 3.02; VAKERICS, supra note 82,
§ 1.02[2] .
89 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; see KANwrr, , supra note 85, § 3.02.
99
 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C, § 13 (prohibiting price discrimination); id. § 14 (prohibiting exclusive
dealing); id. § 19 (prohibiting interlocking directorates).
91 See KANwrr, , supra note 85, § 3.02; VAKERICS, supra note 82, § 1.02[4].
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (1994).
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2. Basis of FTC Authority: "Unfair Method of Competition or
Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice in or Affecting Commerce"
The FTC Act prohibits unfair competition and empowers the FTC
to enforce that prohibition.° The FTC's discretion is broad, with "sec-
tion 5" of the FTC Act granting the FTC power to prevent parties from
committing unfair acts in commerce." Since its creation, the FTC has
been the object of an "ideological tug-of-war" between those who think
that section 5 of the FTC Act was intended only to codify antitrust
principles existing at the time of the statute's passage and those who
believe that the FTC must have discretion to define unfair business
practices and pursue appropriate remedies. 95 Those in the former
group believe that the FTC Act should not extend beyond the common
law principles and statutory provisions embodied in the Sherman Act
in effect at the time of the passage of the FTC Act. 96 Those in the latter
group believe that because there is no limitation to human inventive-
ness, the FTC Act was meant to be a flexible instrument, applicable to
unfair practices of trade that had not yet been imagined at the time of
the statute's passage.° Early decisions of the courts sided with the
former group and interpreted the authority of the FTC narrowly."
95 Id. § 45(a)(1)-(2). Section 45(a) (1) slates that "[q]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful." Id. § 45(a) (1). Section 45(a) (2) states that "[t]he Commission is
hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce." Id. § 45(a)(2).
"Although codified as 15 U.S.C. § 45, section 5 of the FTC Act is generally referred to as
"section 5." See id. § 58. Section 5 states the following:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person,
partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition
or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear
to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest
of the public, it shall issue and serve upon [the party] a complaint stating its charges
Id. § 45(h).
95 See KANwrr, supra note 85, § 3.03. Compare FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) (holding
FTC Act only prohibits violations of common law antitrust principles and of Sherman Act), wish
51 CLING. Rm. 11,593 (1914) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury (0-Del.) that "Nourts have always
recognized the customs of merchants, and it is my impression that under this act the commission
and the courts will be called upon to consider and recognize the fair and unfair customs of
merchants, manufacturers, and traders, and probably prohibit many practices and methods which
have not heretofore been clearly recognized as unlawful." (emphasis added)). See infra notes 99-104
and accompanying text for a discussion of Gratz.
96 See KANwr, r, supra note 85, § 3.03.
97 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914).
98 See, e.g., Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427-28; WARD, supra note 85, § 5.01.
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In 1920, in FTC v. Gratz, the United States Supreme Court held
that a merchant did not engage in unfair competition by tying the sale
of one of its products to the sale of another of its products."" In Gratz,
the respondents were in the business of selling steel ties for binding
bales of cotton and bagging used to wrap the bales.m As part of its
sales agreements, the respondents refused to sell ties unless the pur-
chasers bought a corresponding amount of bagging; thus, a purchaser
had to buy a yard of bagging for each tie purchased)"' The Court
reasoned that the respondents did not hold a monopoly on either ties
or bagging, and that, in the absence of a monopoly, it is permissible
for a merchant to require closely related articles such as ties and
bagging to be bought in conjunction with each other.'" In coming to
its determination, the Court concluded that the FTC Act's language
"unfair method of competition" referred only to those actions that
violated common law or statutory principles prior to the passage of the
FTC Act.'°' Thus, because the sale of closely related products did not
violate the common law or statutory principles in existence when
Congress enacted the FTC Act, the Court held that the FTC could not
issue a cease and desist order.'"
In 1934, in FTC v. RE Keppel & Bro., the United States Supreme
Court held that the FTC did not act improperly in determining that a
candy producer acted unfairly when it adopted a sales strategy that
encouraged gambling by children; the FTC ruled that other manufac-
turers would not adopt the strategy because it was contrary to public
policy, and thus it was unfair)°5 In Keppel, the respondent was a manu-
facturer of "break and take" candy packages. 106 Because certain pack-
ages contained bonus candy and prizes, purchase of break and take
packages involved an element of chance.'" 7
The Court observed that the break and take packages did not
involve fraud or deception.'° 5 Furthermore, the Court noted that corn-
93 253 U.S. at 42B.
10°1d. at 426.
tot see id.
mid. at 428.
I" Id. at 427-28 ("The words 'unfair method of competition' ... are clearly inapplicable to
practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by decep-
tion, bad faith, fraud, or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous
tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.").
104 Gratz, 253 U.S. at 424, 427-29.
1G5 291 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1934). The Court has since cited Keppel as the first in a series of
cases rejecting the narrow interpretation of the Gratz Court. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316, 320-21, 321 n.3 (1966).
1 °6 291 U.S. at 306.
1 °7 See ed. at 307-08.
1118 1d. at 309,
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petitors could adopt the packaging and concluded that the practice
therefore did not involve a monopoly.'" The Court stated that the
FTC's jurisdiction did not extend only to those cases, such as Gratz, in
which the FTC alleged a violation of the common law or Sherman
Act."° The Court reasoned that Congress designed the FTC Act to
fashion relief broader than that available under the common law and
statutes existing at the time of the FTC Act's passage."' The Court
noted that Congress left open the definition of "unfair methods of
competition" in order to allow for changing interpretation."'
The Court concluded that enticing children to gamble is contrary
to public policy." 3 Because other manufacturers refused to contravene
public policy and adopt the break and take packaging, the Court
determined that the effect of this method of packaging was "unfair. ""`'
Thus, the Court held that although the respondents did not restrict
competitors from using break and take packaging, the use of that
packaging was contrary to public policy and therefore other manufac-
turers would not adopt the packaging."' The Court thus held that the
use of such packaging was unfair and a violation of section 5 of the
FTC Act.""
In 1972, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that the FTC could not issue a cease and desist
order where the FTC based its decision to issue the order on an
incorrect determination that a company had acted in contravention of
principles of fair competition." 7
 In coming to its conclusion, however,
the Court stated that the FTC Act empowers the FTC to determine
whether challenged practices, though posing no threat to competition
within the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, nevertheless violate the
FTC Act." 8 In Sperry, the respondent, Sperry & Hutchinson ("S&H"),
was the largest and oldest company in the trading stamp industry."'
111° Id.
11° Id. at 309-10.
111 Keppei, 291 U.S. at 310.
112 /d. at 311-12.
113 ./ii, at 313.
im
115 Id.
116 Keppei, 291 U.S. at 313-14.
"7 405 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1972).
118 Id. at 239.
119 Id. at 234. In the trading stamp industry, a company sells stamps to retailers. See Brian . 1.
Strum, Note, Trading Stamps, 37 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1090, 1092 (1962). In order to reward a consumer
for his or her patronage, retailers give stamps to the consumer based on the amount of the
consumer's purchase. See id. The consumer pastes the stamps in a book. See id. After the consumer
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The FTC charged S&H with suppressing the operation of trading
stamp exchanges and other "free and open" redemption of stamps. 12b
In order to deter such "unofficial" exchanges, S&H placed a notice on
the inside cover of every S&H stamp book advising the consumer that
S&H retained title to the stamps and that transfer of the stamps without
S&H's written permission was prohibited.' 2 ' Although S&H did not
take action against individual consumers, it did file for injunctions against
merchants who redeemed or exchanged stamps without authoriza-
tion.'"
The Court stated that when Congress created the FTC, it declined
to tie the concept of unfairness to a common law or statutory standard;
rather, Congress gave the FTC broad discretion in interpreting that
concept. 12" Citing Keppet, the Court noted that the FTC acts properly
when it acts as a court of equity, considering public values beyond those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust
laws.' 24 In a footnote, the Court implicitly adopted the FTC policy for
determining whether a practice that does not violate the antitrust laws
is nevertheless unfair.' 2 ' Among the factors the FTC looks at is whether
the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes,
the common law or other established concepts of unfairness.' 2" Thus,
has collected a specified number of stamps, the consumer can then exchange the books fur "gifts"
at a redemption center operated by the trading stamp company. See id.
120 See Sperry, 405 U.S. at 234. As an incomplete book has no redemption value and many
"gills" require more than one book, consumers sought to obtain books through exchange with
other consumers. See id. at '236-37. In response to these needs, professional exchanges arose in
which middlemen would sell books of S&H stamps previously acquired from consumers or, for a
fee, would give a consumer another company's stamps fir S&H's or vice versa. See id. at 237.
Furthermore, in order to compete with merchants issuing Mai stamps, some merchants offered
discounts on their goods in exchange for S&H stamps. See id.
121 See id. at 237-38.
122 See id, at 238.
1211 M, at 239-40 (citing S. REP. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914) ('The committee gave careful
consideration to the question as to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable
unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would,
by a general declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine
what practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be better, for the reason ...
that there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into law it would
be quite possible to invent others.") and H.R. CONE. Rio'. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (it is
impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit m human
inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and
prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the
method of definition, it would undertake an endless task")),
124
 Id. at 242-44.
125 Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244 11,5,
126 see id.
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the Court held that the FTC, through the FTC Act, can prohibit
activities that are contrary to public policy. 127 The Court noted, how-
ever, that the FTC had based its cease and desist order on a determi-
nation that S&H had prevented competition and therefore restrained
trade. 123
 Because the order could not be sustained on this ground, the
Court held that the FTC could not issue the cease and desist order,'"
The FTC's power to act as a court of equity, considering public
policy, distinguishes the FTC from the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice ("Antitrust Division"), with whom the FTC shares
antitrust power.' 3° Both agencies have the authority to investigate vio-
lations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.' 3 ' The Antitrust Division,
however, does not have the power to enforce section 5 of the FTC Act,
from which the public policy enforcement mechanism arises.' 32 There-
fore, the Antitrust Division can act only if there has been a violation
127 1d. at 239, 244. The courts are, however, likely to be skeptical when the FTC uses its power
beyond the scope of the Sherman or Clayton Acts. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,
729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984) ("As the Commission moves away from attacking conduct that
is either a violation of the antitrust laws or collusive, coercive, predatory, restrictive or deceitful,
and seeks to break new ground by enjoining otherwise legitimate practices, the closer must be
our scrutiny upon judicial review.").
128 Sperry, 405 U.S. at 246-47.
129 /d. at 248-49.
15° See VAKEittcs, supra note 82, §§ 2.01, 2.03[21. For a discussion of how the FTC and
Antitrust Division allocate oversight responsibilities, see David L. Roll, Dual Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW. 2075
(1976).
181 See VAKERICS, supra note 82, §§ 2.01, 2.02[2].
132 See id. § 2.03[2]. For a particularly relevant discussion of the policies behind antitrust
enforcement, see Robert Pitofsky, l'he Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
Pitofsky's views are especially important in light of his recent appointment to the chairmanship
of the FTC. Pitofsky argues that if the antitrust agencies give capitalism free rein, subject only to
economic considerations, there could be undesirable results. See id. at 1051. First, an economic
structure dominated by a few companies could facilitate the overthrow of domestic institutions
and the installation of a totalitarian regime. See id. at 1053-55. Second, the welfare of the country
would be placed in the hands of a few economically powerful individuals. See id. at 1056-57.
Finally, Pitofsky maintains that the economy could become so dominated by a few corporate giants
that the Government would be forced to intervene in such companies' affairs. Id. at 1057-58.
Pitofsky argues that these issues should be taken into account in the "antitrust equation." Id. at
1075. Pitofsky has indicated that those individuals who want to know about his thinking on media
mergers should read his 1979 article. Bryan Gruley, Pitofsky Will Test Marketplace of Ideas Theory
in FTC's Review of Time Warner-Tiener Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A14. But see Roundtable
Discussion with Enforcement Officials, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 951, 970 (1995) (statements of Pitofsky
that he is not "the greatest advocate for aggressive enforcement of Section 5 beyond the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act").
For a contrary view, i.e. that price theory is the sole basis for antitrust law, see ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). Judge Bork suggests that
antitrust law should be limited to prohibiting (1) suppression of competition by horizontal
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of traditional economic concerns of antitrust.'" Because the mergers
of networks with large corporations do not implicate these traditional
concerns, the Antitrust Division cannot be of much assistance in en-
suring a diversity of voices.'" The FTC, however, with its ability to
consider public policy, may act to constrain such mergers if it finds that
they are not in the public interest.'"
II. THE COMPETING CONCERNS
The merger of a television network with a corporation implicates
competing policy concerns. The nation's democratic traditions require
that the Government respect the free speech rights of its citizens.' 36
The Government also has an interest, however, in ensuring that the
public has access to numerous viewpoints. 137
A. Free Speech Rights
Freedom of expression has particular significance in the realm of
public affairs because speech concerning matters of public interest is
necessary for the exercise of self-government.' 38 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that only through the exchange of
ideas can an educated populace make decisions about its political
destiny. 139 Because the United States Government recognizes the spe-
cial role of free speech in the nation's democracy, the Government is
wary of intruding on the journalistic judgments of the media.m
In 1969, in In re Complaints Concerning Network Coverage of the
Democratic National Convention, the FCC concluded that the networks
afforded a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of opposing
agreement, (2) horizontal mergers creating very large market shares and (3) deliberate predatory
practices designed to drive rivals out of the market. Id. at 405-06.
133 See VAKERICS, supra note 82, §§ 2.01, 2.03[2].
131 See Pearl, supra note 5, at A10.
133 See Sperry, 405 U.S. at 239, 244.
136 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; infra notes 138-236 and accompanying text.
137 See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); infra notes
237-74 and accompanying text.
1313 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM or FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). For a discussion
of the role free speech plays in the democratic process, see R. Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest
in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review
of the Public Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 316-35 (1993).
139 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
140 See Complaints Concerning Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16
F.C.C.2d 650, 654-55 (1969).
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viewpoints on issues that arose at the 1968 Democratic National Con-
vention. 141
 In its decision, the FCC emphasized that it will not review a
broadcaster's news judgment or the quality of its news presentation."!
In Democratic National Convention, the FCC received hundreds of com-
plaints concerning network coverage of the 1968 Democratic National
Convention. ] ' For the most part, these complaints alleged that the
networks slanted their news coverage against the administration's poli-
cies regarding the Vietnam War and in favor of the individuals that
demonstrated against the war.'" The FCC noted that although its
mandate is to license station owners upon a finding that they operate
in the "public interest," there is a tension between that mandate and
the nation's democratic tradition of free speech.' 45
 Therefore, the FCC
refused to review the broadcasters' news judgment, their taste or the
quality of their news and public affairs reporting."' Such questions, the
FCC opined, although appropriate for critics or students of the mass
media, are not appropriate for a government agency."' The FCC stated
that it will act, however, to ensure that broadcasters provide reasonable
opportunities for contrasting viewpoints." Because the FCC concluded
that there was no basis for the contention that the networks failed to
afford proponents of opposing views such an opportunity, the FCC
decided to take no further action. 14'
In 1978, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the United
States Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
corporations from making expenditures to influence a referendum
violated the First Amendment.' 5° In so holding, the Court recognized
that corporations, as well as individuals, can exercise the right of free
speech in the public sphere. 151 In Bellotti, the Court held that the
Government cannot restrict the free speech rights reserved by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, regardless of the source
141 Id. at 658.
112
 Id. at 654.
143 Id. at 650. Although the FCC does not license networks, it does license broadcast stations,
including stations owned by the networks. See infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text. Because
or this licensing power, the FCC was able to ask the networks to respond to the complaints. See
Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 650.
141 See Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 650-51.
145 Id. at 650.
146 Id. at 654.
147 Id. at 655.
1411 /d. at 654.
14'9 Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 658.
150 435 U.S. 765,767-68,795 (1978).
151 Id. at 784.
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of that speech, absent a compelling state interest) 52 In Bellotti, the
appellants, banking associations and business corporations, wanted to
publicize their opposition to a referendum proposal to amend the
Massachusetts Constitution to authorize the legislature to enact a gradu-
ated income tax on individuals.'" A Massachusetts statute, however,
prohibited corporations from spending money for the purpose of
influencing a vote on any question other than those materially affect-
ing the interests of the corporation.'" The statute also explicitly stated
that no question submitted to the voters concerning income taxation
could be construed as materially affecting corporate interests.'"
The Court stated at the outset that the question it faced was not
whether corporations have First Amendment rights, but whether the
statute abridged the type of expression that the First Amendment was
designed to protect.'" Because the referendum question was a matter
of public concern, the Court reasoned that expression of opinion
regarding that question was safeguarded by the First Amendment. 157
The Court further stated that the value of the speech lay in its capacity
to inform the public rather than in its source.'" Because of its impor-
tance, the Court reasoned, such speech did not lose its First Amend-
ment protection simply because its source was a corporation.I 59 The
Court expressed its concern that if the legislature confined business
corporations to business-related topics, it could limit other corpora-
tions—religious, charitable or civic—to their respective area of exper-
tise when engaging in public discourse, and this, the Court found, was
impermissible.'"
Massachusetts offered two justifications for its limitations on cor-
porate speech.' 6 ' First, Massachusetts asserted an interest in sustaining
the individual citizen's role in the electoral process.'" Massachusetts
argued that corporate participation in discussion of the referendum
would exert undue influence on the outcome, eroding voter confidence
in the political process.'" Second, Massachusetts argued that the stat-
152 Id. at 784, 795.
166 /d. at 767-68, 769, 770 0.4.
134 See id. at 767-68.
155 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768.
155 Id. at 775-76.
157 1d, at 776.
158 /d. at 777.
156 1d. at 784.
166 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785.
161 See id. at 787.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 789.
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ute protected the rights of corporate shareholders who do not share
the views that the corporations intended to espouse.' 64
The Court stated that the statute would be upheld only if Massa-
chusetts's justifications survived the strict scrutiny investigation a court
must undertake in the face of a state-imposed restriction of freedom
of speech.'65
 The Court stated that as important as Massachusetts's
justifications may be, they were neither implicated in this case nor
adequately protected by the statute and therefore could not justify a
prohibition on free speech.m Thus, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it prohibited protected speech, regardless of
its source, in a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest.' 67
Despite governmental recognition of the importance of free ex-
pression, the courts have recognized that broadcasters' freedom of
expression is not absolute.' 68 In 1943, in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court held that in further-
ance of the public interest, the FCC could limit the rights of network
companies in their relations with radio stations without impinging on
the networks' First Amendment rights. ' 69 In National Broadcasting, NBC
and CBS challenged FCC regulations governing relations between
radio networks and radio broadcast facilities. 170
 The Court rejected the
° See id. at 787.
]65 Bellotti, 435 U.S, at 786.
166 Id. at 787-88. The Court pointed out that there was no empirical data to support Massachu-
setts's contention that corporate participation in referenda jeopardized the electoral process. Id.
at 789-90. The Court also found that, if the State's interest was in protecting shareholders who
did not agree with the position the corporation would take, the statute was both underinclusive
and overinclusive. Id. at 792-93. The Court reasoned that the statute was underinclusive because
although it prohibited corporate expenditures on referenda, it did not forbid other corporate
activity that would express the corporation's views. Id. at 793. The Court reasoned that the statute
was overinclusive because it would prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a refer-
endum proposal even if all of the shareholders authorized the expenditure. Id. at '794.
167 /d. at 784, 795. In a concurring opinion, Chief justice Burger specifically addressed the
issue of media conglomerates. Id. at 795-802 (Burger, C.j., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
stated that the Massachusetts statute was especially disquieting because it could limit the First
Amendment rights of media corporations. Id. at 796 (Burger, Cj., concurring).
' 68 See, e.g., Red Lion, 367 U.S. at 395; National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943).
"319 U.S. at 227.
170 1d. at 193-209. The regulations provided that (1) networks could not bind affiliates'
programming choices through exclusivity clauses, (2) networks could not enter into agreements
with stations that would prohibit them from supplying programming to other stations serving the
same area, (3) the term of network affiliation contracts was limited to two years, (4) networks
could not bind affiliates' programming choices through option time clauses, (5) an affiliate could
not be prevented from rejecting any network program that it believed was not in the public
interest, (6) networks were prohibited from owning more than one station in each market, (7)
a standard broadcast station could not affiliate with any network organization that owned more
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idea that the FCC is limited to mere technological considerations when
granting licenses."' The Court hypothesized a situation in which one
person attempted to obtain the licenses for the only two radio stations
in an area and concluded that the situation would be subject to the
FCC's licensing and regulatory powers.' 72 Noting that the FCC's man-
date is to protect the public interest, the Court stated that there was
no evidence to indicate that Congress did not intend for the FCC to
have sweeping authority."s
The Court also noted that the Communications Act was passed at
a time in which the radio industry was in a state of dynamic change
and that the Communications Act gave the FCC expansive powers.' 74
The Court therefore concluded that the FCC was justified in promul-
gating regulations designed to correct abuses revealed by its investiga-
tion of network broadcasting.'" The Court noted that the regulations
were not irrevocable, arid, for each license application that comes
before the FCC, the FCC must still exercise an ultimate judgment as
to whether the grant of a license would be in the public interest.'
The Court addressed two constitutional challenges made by NBC
and CBS.'" First, the networks contended that the "public interest"
standard was so vague as to be an impermissible delegation of legisla-
tive power to the FCC by Congress.'" The Court rejected this conten-
tion, stating that the standard was not a general reference that lacked
criteria to guide the FCC in its determination.'" Second, the networks
argued that their First Amendment free speech rights were proscribed
by the regulations.' 8° The Court dismissed this argument, reasoning
that because the broadcast spectrum is limited, some who wish to use
it must be denied licenses. 181 The Court stated that the question was
whether the FCC's denial of licenses to parties who engage in spe-
cified network practices is a denial of the constitutional right of free
speech.' 82 The Court reasoned that the First Amendment right to free
than one networking operation and (8) networks could not introduce any clause in an affiliate
contract that would give their the power to control station rates. See id.
171 1d. at 216.
172 1d. at 217-18.
175 1d.
174 National Broad., 319 U.S. at 219.
175
 id. at 224.
1711 1d. at 225.
1 " Id. at 225-27.
178 See id. at 225-26.
179 National Broad., 319 U.S. at 226.
18° See id.
181 1d.
182 1d. at 226-27.
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speech does not include the right to a broadcast license and that the
denial of a license for valid reasons under the Communications Act is
thus not a denial of free speech. 183
 The Court held, therefore, that the
Communications Act authorized the FCC to promulgate the broadcast
regulations and that the regulations were a lawful exercise of the FCC's
power.' 84
In 1969, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's application of the Fairness Doc-
trine. 185
 The Fairness Doctrine is a twofold requirement that broadcast-
ers present public issues on broadcast stations and give each side of
those issues fair coverage.' 88
 The Fairness Doctrine is the product of
the FCC's interpretation of section 315(a) of the Communications
Act. 187
 The FCC codified the Fairness Doctrine in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910.' 88
Traditionally, the Commission has used the Fairness Doctrine to ensure
that licensees, having chosen to cover a controversial issue of public
importance, afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of
contrasting viewpoints.' 89
 The purpose of the doctrine is to maintain
broadcasting as a medium of free speech for all American people,
rather than for just a few licensees.m
In Red Lion, the Court held that the FCC could require a broad-
caster to provide free rebuttal airtime to an individual who had been
verbally attacked on the broadcaster's station.' 9 ' In Red Lion, the Red
Lion Broadcasting Company ("Red Lion") operated a Pennsylvania
radio station, WGCB.' 92 WGCB aired a broadcast in which a commen-
tator attacked the character of an author, Fred J. Cook. 19" When Cook
i" Id. at 227.
154
 National Broad., 319 U.S. at 224.
185 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-90.
1 m See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1995).
157 See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). Under section 315(a), broadcasters are obligated to operate in
the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on
issues of public importance." Id. (emphasis added).
155 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910. Section 73.1910 states:
The Fairness Doctrine is contained in section 315(a) of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, which provides that broadcasters have certain obligations to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance.
Id.
189 See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 654.
I"" See, e.g., id. at 655.
191
 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 372-73, 401.
' 92 1d. at 371.
195
	 id. The commentator, the Reverend Billy James Hargis, alleged that Cook, author of
Goldwater—Extremist on the Right, had been fired by a newspaper for making false charges, had
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heard of the broadcast, he sought free reply time on WGCB. 1 " The
FCC determined that Cook was entitled to the free air time,w 5 On
appeal, after the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision, the Court concluded
that the plain language of section 315 of the Communications Act
indicates that the "public interest" is served by discussion of both sides
of controversial public issues thus vindicating the view that the Fairness
Doctrine is inherent in the FCC's mandate. 190
 The Court thus held that
the Fairness Doctrine was a legitimate exercise of congressionally dele-
gated authority. 1 "7
The Court then considered Red Lion's challenge to the Fairness
Doctrine under a First Amendment rationale.' 98 Red Lion contended
that the Fairness Doctrine's requirement that it air certain viewpoints
abridged its First Amendment rights.'"`' The Court noted that although
broadcasting is a medium affected by the First Amendment, differing
First Amendment standards are applied to different kinds of media. 2°
The Court recognized a necessary limitation on the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters that does not inhere in the cases of individuals
who are speaking, writing or publishing. 20 ' The Court acknowledged
that one individual's right of free speech does not embrace a right to
suppress another's free speech. 2°2
 The Court reasoned, however, that
the radio spectrum does not allow access to all individuals who desire
to use it; the number of available frequencies is simply too limited. 2"3
The Court stated that if individuals used the spectrum without direc-
tion, there would exist a "cacophony of competing voices, none of
which could be clearly or predictably heard." 2°4
 The Court observed
that no one has a First Amendment right to a broadcast license. 205
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, those who are granted licenses do
worked for a Communist-affiliated periodical, had defended Alger Hiss and had attacked f. Edgar
Hoover and the Central Intelligence Agency. See id.
194
 See id. at 371-72.
195 See id. at 372.
196 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 372-73,380.
197 1d. at 385.
1118 Id. at 386.
1 "9 See id.
20° Id. As an example, the Court cited permissible restrictions on sound trucks due to ille
high levels of noise they can produce, Id, at 387 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)),
201 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
202 1d. at 387.
2°1 Id. at 358.
204 1d. at 376.
2°5 1d. at 389.
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not have a right to monopolize a frequency to the exclusion of oth-
ers.2D6 The Court stated that the First Amendment does not prevent the
Government from requiring licensees to share their broadcasting rights
with others. 207
 The Court noted that by so requiring, the Government
ensures a "marketplace of ideas."" 8
 Thus, the Supreme Court upheld
the FCC's implementation of the Fairness Doctrine as a constitutionally
delegated exercise of power that does not abridge licensees' First
Amendment rights. 209
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court again considered a
limitation on free speech in the context of a restriction on broadcast
media outlets. 21" In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the
United States Supreme Court held that Congress cannot forbid non-
commercial broadcast stations that are recipients of federal funds from
editorializing.2 " The Court stated that the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967 ("Public Broadcasting Act") established the Corporation for Pub-
lic Broadcasting ("CPB") for the purpose of disbursing federal funds
to noncommercial broadcasting facilities. 212
 Section 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act forbade the disbursement of funds to stations that
engaged in editorializing.''s The League of Women Voters of California
challenged the constitutionality of section 399. 2 " The Court, citing
Bellotti, noted that speech concerning public affairs is entitled to an
exacting degree of First Amendment protection. 215
 The Court stated,
however, that regulation of broadcast media differs from regulation of
other media and that the Court's decisions have never required that
such regulations serve a "compelling" state interest. 216 The Court noted
206
 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
2°7 Id.
2°8 Id. at 390.
2°9 Id. at 400-01. Five years after Red Lion, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the
Court struck down a Florida Supreme Court decision enforcing a Florida statute that was roughly
equivalent to the Fairness Doctrine but applied to newspapers. 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974). In
its ruling, the Court did not discuss the Red Lion decision. See id. at 243-59. The Florida statute
provided that if a candidate for nomination or election is attacked by any newspaper. that
candidate has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of charge, any reply the
candidate wishes to make. See id. at 244. The Court reasoned that the statute compelled publishers
to publish that which they would not otherwise publish. See id. at 256. Because the statute intruded
on the functions of editors, the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 258.
2111
 See FCC V. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
211 Id. at 366, 402.
212 Id. at 366.
215 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982) (amended 1988).
214 See League, 468 U.S. at 371.
215 Id. at 375-76.
216 Id. at 376.
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that it has upheld requirements that broadcasters present contrast-
ing viewpoints and that broadcasters provide airtime access to federal
candidates.27
 These requirements, the Court noted, further the pub-
lic's First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of
matters of public concern."' The Court reasoned that the public's
interest necessarily outweighs the individual station owner's right to
advocate one position without advocating an opposing view:2 w Never-
theless, the Court noted that the Government is restricted in the extent
to which it may curtail broadcasters' free speech rights. 22" The Court
said that it would uphold a free speech limitation on a broadcaster only
if the limitation was tailored to further a substantial state interest, such
as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues. 221 The
Court distinguished the editorial prohibition from the fairness require-
ment of Red Lion by stating that section 399 prohibited broadcasters
from speaking out on public issues while the Fairness Doctrine simply
required broadcasters, if they engage in discussion of public issues, to
air opposing viewpoints. 222
The Government offered two rationales for the editorial ban. 225
First, the Government contended that the ban was necessary to ensure
that the Government did not coerce stations receiving funding from
the CPB to editorialize in the Government's favor. 224 Second, the Gov-
ernment argued that the ban ensured that funding recipients did not
become targets for capture by private interest groups seeking to es-
pouse their own agendas. 225
The Court dismissed the first argument, stating that the Public
Broadcasting Act already contained statutory provisions designed to
insulate broadcasters from government pressure. 226 Unlike the ban on
editorializing, the Court concluded, these provisions do not infringe
on First Amendment rights. 227
 Furthermore, the Court stated that the
217 Id. at 378-79 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367 (upholding Fairness Doctrine) and CBS,
Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding right of access for federal candidates)).
218 Id. at 380.
216 League, 468 U.S. at 380.
22° Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 385.
223 See id. at 384-85.
224 See League, 468 U.S. at 384-85.
225 See id. at 385.
226 Id. at 388-89. For example, the Public Broadcasting Act prohibits the CPB from support-
ing political candidates, requires that the CPB disburse funds in a neutral manlier and forbids
the CPB from owning stations. 47 U.S.C. 4 596(1)(3), (g) (1) (A), (g) (3)(A) (1988).
227 League, 468 U.S. at 390.
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individualized voices of many small station owners would not invite
retaliation by the Federal Government. 228
The Court then addressed the second argument that the ban on
editorializing prevented private interests from capturing fund recipi-
ents.226 Assuming that private groups did capture a station, the Court
reasoned that they could propagate their views, via program content,
interviews or guest commentators, regardless of the ban. 23° The Court
therefore reasoned that the ban was akin to the underinclusive statute
of Bellotti, which prohibited corporations from influencing referenda
but did not address other means by which corporations could affect
public policy. 23 ' Furthermore, the Court expressed its view that there
are other methods, such as the Fairness Doctrine, to ensure that sta-
tions do not become propaganda tools of private groups.232
In closing, the Court did not address whether the Government's
asserted goals were sufficient to justify an abridgment of speech." The
Court did note, however, that the statute was not narrowly tailored to
address any of those goals."' The Court concluded, therefore, that
even if the dangers at which the ban on editorializing was aimed were
sufficiently substantial to justify a limit on speech, the restriction was
not crafted with sufficient precision to justify such an abridgment. 235
The Court thus held that section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act
was unconstitutional because it impermissibly intruded on free speech
righ ts."6
B. Public Policy of Maintaining Diversity of Information Sources
1. Statutory Language
In both the Communications Act and the Telcommunications Act,
Congress adopted language favoring the maintenance of a diversity of
voices. 237 Although the stated purpose of the Communications Act, as
codified in section 151, does not specify diversity as a goal of the
Communications Act, sections 309, 521, 532 and 548 indicate that
228 Id. at 390-91.
229 Id. at 396.
23° Id.
231 See id.; Bellatti, 435 U.S. at 793.
252 League, 468 U.S. at 397-98.
233 Id. at 398.
234 Id. at 398-99.
235 Id. at 398.
236 Id.
237 See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
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Congress intended the maintenance of diversity to be a goal of the
Communications Act. 235
 Section 309 details the application process for
a broadcast license. 2" This section specifically states that in granting
licenses, the FCC should grant licenses so as to promote diversity in
media communications. 240
 Section 521, which defines the goals of the
FCC in regard to cable communications, similarly states that the FCC
should act to assure that the public has access to the widest possible
diversity of information sources. 241 Section 532, like section 521, details
the goals of the FCC concerning cable communications and reiterates
the purpose of the FCC to secure a diversity of information sources. 242
Finally, section 548, which deals with cable and satellite programming,
declares its purpose to promote diversity in the multichannel video
programming market. 2"
The recent Telecommunications Act also emphasizes the goal of
maintaining a diversity of media voices. 244 In section 257(a), Congress
instructs the FCC to conduct a proceeding to identify and eliminate
market entry barriers to the telecommunications market.'" The sec-
tion is specifically targeted to aid entrepreneurs and other small busi-
nesses who would otherwise encounter difficulties in entering the
telecommunications market. 246
 Congress instructed the FCC, in hold-
ing these proceedings, to promote the purposes of the Telecommuni-
cations Act favoring diversity of media voices. 247
2s8 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 532, 548 (Supp. V 1993); 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 309, 521 (1988). See supra
note 77 for the text of section 151.
289
	 U.S.C. § 309.
24" Id. § 309(i) (3) (A) ("The Commission shall establish rules and procedures to ensure that
.. significant preferences will be granted to applicants or groups of applicants, the grant to
which of the license or permit would increase the diversification of ownership of the media of
mass communications.").
291 Id. § 521 (noting, in relevant part, that one of the purposes of the subchapter is to "assure
that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity
of information sources and services to the public").
212 Id. § 532(a) ("The purpose of this section is to promote competition in the delivery ()I'
diverse sources of video programming and to assure that the widest possible diversity of informa-
tion sources are made available to the public from cable systems in a manner consistent with
growth and development of cable systems.").
243 Id. § 548(a) ("The purpose of this section is to promote the public interest, convenience,
and necessity by increasing competition and diversity in the multichannel video programming
market
244
 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 257 (b) , 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. ( I 10
Stat.) 56, 77.
245 Id. § 257(a).
241i Id.
247 Id. § 257(b).
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2. Congressional History
Congress has repeatedly expressed its intent to maintain a diversity
of media viewpoints. 248
 In floor debates on the passage of the Commu-
nications Act, there was a heated discussion of a Senate amendment,
ultimately rejected, that would have allocated one fourth of all radio
broadcasting facilities to nonprofit associations. 249 In discussing the
amendment, Senator Hatfield (R-W. Va.) expressed concern that if
large companies continued to dominate the spectrum to the exclusion
of others, Congress would be forced to seize broadcast facilities for the
benefit of the American people as a whole. 2" House representatives
expressed similar sentiments in discussing the House version of the
amendment to the Communications Act. 251 Members of the House also
expressed concern over power of the existing networks to control the
broadcast spectrum to the detriment of other parties who wanted to
use it.252
Congressional intent to preserve a diversity of voices has contin-
ued throughout the history of the enforcement of the Communica-
tions Act.'" In 1985, a House Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion and Finance Subcommittee hearing specifically addressed the
question of media mergers. 254 Although Congressional members nei-
ther supported nor opposed corporate acquisitions of broadcast net
 See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
249 See 78 CONG. REC. 8828-37,8842-46 (1934). Although many senators expressed support
for the goals of the amendment, they did not think an amendment was the proper means by
which to achieve those goals. See id. Rather, members of Congress expressed the belief that the
licensing agency should make the determination as to the allocation of frequencies. See id.
26" See id. at 8834. During the same session, Senator Dill (D-Wash.) expressed his concern
about one individual obtaining all the broadcasting facilities in a given community. See id. at 8851.
Because of his concerns, Senator Dill proposed an amendment that would prohibit monopo-
lization of radio facilities by one licensee. See id. During discussion of the amendment, Senator
Dill and Senator Fess (R-Ohio) had the following exchange:
Mr. Fess: This [amendment] would not interfere with [Cincinnati radio station]
WLW?
Mr. Dill: Only if Wl.W reached out and undertook to get control of all the other
stations in Cincinnati.
Mr. Fess: After that station had been given the frequency it would not be inter-
fered with if operating within the law?
Mr. Dill: No; but if it went out and secured all the other stations in Cincinnati,
then someone else might get a license.
Id. The amendment was agreed to. See id.
251 See, e.g., id. at 10319 (statement of Rep. Maloney (D-Conn.)).
252 See, e.g., id. at 10326-27 (statement of Rep, Truax (D-Ohio)).
253
 See, e.g., Media Mergers and Takeovers: The FCC and the Public Interest: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Gong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Hearing Before Subcomm.).
254 See id.
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works, they made it clear that diversity of viewpoints is an important
public policy.""
3. Supreme Court Rulings
Just as the Legislature has expressed a desire to maintain a diver-
sity of voices in broadcasting, judicial concern about assuring a multi-
tude of sources of public information has been reflected in the rulings
of the United States Supreme Court.'" In 1945, in Associated Press v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a district court
did not err in granting summary judgment enjoining members of a
press association from acting in restraint of trade. 2" In Associated Press,
newspaper publishers were members of the Associated Press ("AP"), a
cooperative association established for the collection and dissemina-
tion of news.'" AP's bylaws prohibited its members from selling infor-
mation to anyone other than AP and from furnishing information
provided by AP to nonmembers prior to publication.'" The district
court found that the bylaws were restraints on trade because they stifled
competition in the newspaper publishing field, and on appeal by AP,
the Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding. 266
 In the course
of the decision, the Court addressed AP's contention that to apply
antitrust principles to AP constituted an abridgment of the freedom
of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. 26 ' The Court rejected
this argument, stating that freedom of the press from governmental
interference does not sanction oppression of that freedom by private
interests, such as those represented by AP. 262
 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court noted the importance of maintaining diverse sources
255 See id. at 2 ("[We have a] concern about diversity in the marketplace of ideas to make
sure that the American public have the broadest array of ideas from which to choose. I think that
is perhaps a basic public policy concern from which we examine the procedures of the FCC."
(statement of Rep. Wirth (D-Colo.))); id. at 56 ("[E]nriching the programming available to the
American public . . . [and] providing more choices to the American public ... are the broad
themes and the broad public policy goals that I think we all share." (statement of Rep. Wirth));
id. at 63 ("The [FCC] has broad authority under the [Communications Act] to consider broad
policy questions in proposed transfers. The [FCC] can consider ... whether a proposed transfer
would impede the development of diverse and antagonistic sources of information to the Ameri-
can public ...." (statement of Rep. Dingell (D-Mich.))).
256 See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
257 326 U.S. at 5,12,23.
258 Id. at 3-4.
259
	 id. at 9.
2" Id. at I1-12.
"I Id. at 19.
262 Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
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of public information.263 Because the bylaws represented restraints on
trade, the Court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment
enjoining members of AP from observing the bylaws. 2"
In 1978, in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, the
United States Supreme Court held that the FCC could promulgate
regulations prohibiting joint ownership of a newspaper and a television
or radio broadcast station in the same community. 263 In National Citi-
zens Committee, various parties, including the National Citizens Com-
mittee for Broadcasting, the National Association of Broadcasters and
several broadcast licensees, petitioned for review of the regulations
described above.266
 The Court reasoned that it was not inconsistent for
the FCC to conclude that maximum benefit for the public interest
would follow from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote
diversification of the mass media.267 The Court thus held that the
promulgation of regulations was a permissible exercise of the FCC's
authority:268
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court yet again expressed the
public policy goal of maintaining diverse broadcast ownership. 269 In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the Court held that the FCC's policies
favoring minorities were valid exercises of FCC authority. 270 In Metro
Broadcasting, parties challenged FCC policies that favored minorities
in the granting of new licenses and permitted a limited category of
existing broadcast stations to be transferred only to minority-controlled
firms.27 ' The plaintiffs contended that the policies violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.272 The Court reasoned
265 1d, ("[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public ....").
264 Id. at 5, 12, 23.
"5 436 U.S. at 779.
266 Id. at 789.
267 Id. at 795. In the course of its discussion, the Court reasoned that there may exist factors
more important than diversity in the FCC's determination of whether to renew a license. Id. at
805-06. The Court noted with approval the FCC policy of renewing broadcast licenses for those
broadcasters who have acted meritoriously during the course of the licensing period. Id. at 806.
The Court observed that such a policy brings proven broadcast service to the public and rewards
licensees who have invested money and effort to produce quality performance. Id. at 805. The
Court stated that "[e]ven where an incumbent is challenged by a competing applicant who offers
greater potential in terms of diversification, the [FCC's] general practice has been to go with the
'proved product' and grant renewal if the incumbent has rendered meritorious service." Id.
at 806.
268
 Id. at 802.
269 See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 547.
270 1d. at 552.
271 Id.
272 see id.
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that the policies promoted programming diversity and that such diver-
sky was an important governmental objective that can serve as a con-
stitutional basis for those policies. 273
 The Court thus held that the
policies were a legitimate application of FCC power. 274
III. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN STRUCTURING THE MERGER
When a corporation acquires a television network, it necessarily
acquires, subject to FCC approval, the broadcast licenses granted to
the stations owned by the network. 275
 Because there is a transfer of the
licenses to the new corporate entity, the FCC may approve, condition
or deny the merger. 27t' Similarly, if the FTC (as opposed to the FCC)
determines that the merger violates public policy, it can act as a "court
of equity" to condition the merger.'"
A. FCC
Congress created the Communications Act to regulate radio. 278
The original text does not mention television, and Congress has not
specifically amended the Communications Act to include television. 27"
Nevertheless, the regulations for radio have been consistently inter-
preted to apply to television as well as to radio. 28°
Among the FCC's powers are the powers to grant licenses, 28 ' renew
licenses282
 and promulgate rules and regulations. 283 The FCC only li-
275 Id. at 566.
274 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting to the extent that it was inconsistent with Adarand's holding that all racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and will only he constitutional if they are narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995). This decision
does not, however, disturb the Court's determination that diversity is an important governmental
objective. See id.; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566.
275 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988).
r" See infra notes 278-96 and accompanying text.
277 See FTC v, Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
278 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); HAMBURG & BROTMAN, su/.ra note 21, § 3.01 W.
279 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613; HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 3.01111.
28°See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 21, § 3.0111].
28L See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). See supra note 78 for the text of section 307(a).
282 See id. § 307(c). Section 307(c) states the following:
(c) Terms
[U]pon the expiration of any license, upon application therefor, a renewal of
such license may he granted from time to time for a term of not to exceed five years
in the case of television broadcasting licenses, for a term of not to exceed seven
years in the case of radio broadcasting licenses, and for a term of not to exceed ten
years in the case of other licenses, if the Commission finds that public interest,
convenience, and necessity would be served thereby.
Id. § 307(c).
283 See id. §§ 154(i), 303. Section 154(i) states the following:
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censes individual stations; it does not license networks. 284 The FCC
does, however, exercise control over the networks by virtue of its regu-
lations concerning station affiliation agreements, programming poli-
cies and other matters involving stations and networks. 28' By preventing
stations from engaging in network agreements that it believes are
harmful to the station or to the public interest, the FCC can exert
pressure on the operations of a network. 286
As part of its mandate, the FCC controls not only initial licensing
procedures, but also transfers of licenses. 28' It is through this authority
that the FCC can influence corporate takeovers of networks. 288 Each
network owns at least seven television stations, and the transfer of
ownership of a network necessarily entails the transfer of ownership of
those stations subject to FCC approval under section 310(d). 289
Even if a proposed merger does not violate any of the FCC's
specific regulations, the FCC may condition a merger in order to
ensure that the merger is in the public interest. 290 The FCC may do so
(1) Duties and powers
The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations,
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in
the execution of its functions.
Id. § 154. Section 303 provides the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time,
as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall— „
(i) Have authority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations en-
gaged in [network broadcasting] ,
(r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and condi-
tions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this chapter . . . .
Id. § 303.
284 See I IILLIARD, supra note 54, at 33.
285 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(i); HILLIARD, supra note 54, at 33.
255
 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(i); HILLIARD, supra note 54, at 33.
287 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 310(d) . See supra note 78 for the text of section 309(a). Section
310(d) mandates prior FCC authorization before a licensee may transfer control of its license or
assign it to another party. Id. § 310(d). Section 310(d) provides that:
No . . . station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned, or
disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by
transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any person
except upon application to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby. Any such
application shall be disposed of as if the proposed transferee or assignee were
making application ... for the permit or license in question ...
Id. § 310(d).
.	 288 See id. § 310(d),
289 See id,; VAR wrr, supra note 20. For a discussion of the station holdings of the various
networks see supra note 20.
29" See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. V 1993); 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 307, 309. Sec supra notes 78, 282
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by denying the grant or transfer of the license applications necessary
to operate the broadcast facilities if the companies do not take certain
steps determined by the FCC. 29' Despite this broad-based power, some
individuals have expressed the belief that the FCC need only act if
there has been a violation of a specific regulation. 292
At the most extreme, the FCC can deny the grant or transfer of a
license.293 If the FCC does not find that granting or permitting the
transfer of a particular license serves the public interest, it will desig-
nate the application for hearing. 294 The burden of proceeding with the
and 283 for the relevant text of sections 154(i), 307 and 309. In relevant part, the text of section
301 is as follows:
It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the control of
the United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for
the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof; by persons for limited
periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license
shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods
of the license. No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission
of energy or communications or signals by radio ... except under and in accord-
ance with this chapter and with a license in that behalf granted under the provisions
of this chapter.
Id. § 301.
291 See id. §§ 309(a), 310(d). An application for the transfer of a license is treated as if it were
an original application for the license. See id. § 310(d).
292 This attitude was reflected in comments made by former FCC Chairman Fowler at a 1985
House subcommittee hearing in which Chairman Fowler indicated that the FCC's regulations in
themselves ensure the existence of a diversity of voices. Hearing Before Subcomm., supra note 253,
at 69. Representative Bryant (D-Tex.) and Chairman Fowler had the following exchange:
Mr. Bryant: What are the principles that you understand from the [Communica-
tions Acti that you are to apply to your decisions regarding a license transfer?
Mr. Fowler: We have to make sure that they comply with the alien ownership
requirements, that they have the requisite character, that they are financially
qualified. As to rules, we want to make sure that they comply with our multiple-
ownership rules. We want to make sure that they file a proper Equal Employment
Opportunity Program proposed when they take over the operation of the stations
in question.
Mr. Bryant: What about diversified ownership?
Mr. Fowler: Diversity in ideas or competition is subsumed and included within our
multiple-ownership rules. For example, the rule of 12, which is designed to both foster
diversity and also to encourage competition to make sure that each market is workably
competitive.
Mr. Bryant: You believe once they have not violated that kind of a rule with regard to
multiple ownership, that there is no further need for the FCC to inquire into the effect of
a transfer on diversification?
Mr. Fowler: There is a whole panoply of ownership rules, including local ownership
rules, cross-interest, and those are a package. Yes, I am satisfied that if they meet all of
the multiple-ownership rules, that we can be reasonably assured that we will have diversity
in ideas as well as workable competition.
Id. (emphasis added).
293 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 310(d).
294 See id. §§ 309(e), 310(d).
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introduction of evidence and the burden of proof are on the appli-
cant. 2" Because the burden of proof is on the applicant and the FCC
has a broad underlying mandate to ensure that the public interest is
satisfied, the FCC thus has wide discretion in granting or permitting
the transfer of licenses, which the courts will not lightly dismiss. 296
B. P7'C
Similarly, the FTC has broad discretion in the exercise of its
mandate to prevent unfair competition. 297
 The Hart-Scott-Rodino An-
titrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires that parties to mergers file
a premerger plan with the FTC and the Antitrust Division and wait a
specified period of time before consummating the merger. 2°8 The pur-
pose of the filing is to give both of these governmental entities an
opportunity to determine whether or not the proposed merger violates
the antitrust laws. 299
 If the FTC has reason to believe that the proposed
merger will violate the antitrust laws, it may seek an injunction to
prevent the merger.30° Alternatively, the FTC may require that the
merging companies modify the transaction so as to conform to the
antitrust laws. 3°' Finally, the FTC may permit the merger to proceed
provided that the merging parties agree to a consent order designed
to satisfy the antitrust objections. 302
 Although orders of the FTC are
265 See id,
296 See id. §§ 309, 310(d); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) ("Our
opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the [FCC's] judgment regarding how the public
interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference,"); National Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943) ("Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the
[FCC] was based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority
granted by Congress."); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("In
making a public interest judgment tinder the Communications Act, the [FCC] is exercising both
its congressionally-delegated power and its expertise; it clearly enjoys broad deference on issues
of both fact and policy.").
29/ See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46 (1994); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946).
298 15 U.S.C. § 18a. Section 18a limits the filing requirement to those parties engaged in
interstate commerce and those entities of a certain monetary value. Id. § 18a(a). Even if 15 U.S.C,
§ 18a does not require the merging entities to file a premerger report, the FTC may initiate an
investigation upon receiving notice of the merger. See ROLL, supra note 130, at 2084; VAKERICS,
supra note 82, § 9.03[2]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45.
419 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) ("The [FTC], with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney
General [of the Antitrust Division] ... shall require that the notification . . . be in such form
and contain such documentary material and information relevant to a proposed acquisition as
is necessary and appropriate to enable the [FTC] and the Assistant Attorney General to determine
whether such acquisition may, if consummated, violate the antitrust laws . .").
"0 See id. § 53(b); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 599 (1966) (FTC seeks injunction
to maintain status quo until FTC can make a determination as to legality of merger).
See VAKERICS, supra note 82, § 9.03[2].
"2 See id. Typically, the FTC permits the merger subject to a consent agreement. See id.
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subject to judicial review, the FTC's discretion in structuring a merger
is broad.m3 Courts will interfere with an order only if it bears no
"reasonable relation" to the unlawful practices found by the FTC."'
IV. CONTROL OF THE BROADCAST CORPORATION AFTER THE MERGER
Many of the powers that the FCC and the FTC exercise before a
media merger can also be employed after the merger.'" The FCC must
still ensure that the broadcast corporation acts in the public interest. 506
Similarly, Congress has authorized the FTC to prohibit unfair practices
after the merger as well as before."° 7
A. FCC
Just as the Communications Act grants the FCC broad authority
to enforce its mandate of protecting the public interest in issuing and
permitting transfers of broadcast licenses, the statute likewise grants
the FCC enforcement authority after the licensing." In addition to its
review of license renewals""`' and its ability to promulgate rules and
regulations,310 the FCC may revoke station licenses"" and issue cease
and desist orders.'12
 Although the FCC has broad powers to revoke
903 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) ("Any [party] required by an order of the (FTC] to cease and desist
from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of such order in
the court of appeals of the United States  "); Siegel, 327 U.S. at 611 ("The [Frei has wide
discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in this
area of trade and commerce.").
344 See Siegel, 327 U.S. at 613 ("[T]he courts will not interfere except where the remedy
selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.").
"5 See supra notes 275-304 and accompanying text.
501 See infra notes 308-28 and accompanying text.
"7 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
3" See infra notes 309-28 and accompanying text.
34)9 See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1988).
319 See id, §§ 154(i), 303(i), (r).
311
 See id. § 312(a). Section 312(a) states the following:
(a) Revocation of station license .. .
The Commission may revoke any station license ..
(3) for willful or repeated failure to operate substantially asset forth in the license;
(4) for willful or repeated violation of, or willful or repeated failure to observe
any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation of the Commission author-
ized by this chapter ...
Id. § 312(a).
312 See id. § 312(6). Section 312(b) states the following:
(b) Cease and desist orders
Where any person (1) has failed to operate substantially as set forth in this license,
(2) has violated or failed to observe any of the provisions of this chapter ... or (3)
has violated or failed to observe any rule or regulation of the Commission author-
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licenses or issue cease and desist orders, there is a presumption in favor
of the licensee once a license has been issued, and both the burden
of proceeding and the burden of introduction of evidence are on the
FCC in such actions.s's Therefore, the revocation proceedings differ
from the application proceedings, in which the burden of proof is on
the applicant.314 Nevertheless, the FCC has broad discretion in deter-
mining the public interest, and courts are unlikely to overrule an FCC
adjudication that a broadcaster has acted contrary to the public interest.'"
A particular policy that the FCC has followed in its control of
broadcast outlets is the Fairness Doctrine. 318 In recent years, however,
the Fairness Doctrine has fallen into disfavor with the FCC and the
FCC has refused to enforce it.s' 7 The courts have deferred to the FCC's
decision to abandon the Fairness Doctrine. 318
In 1987, in In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, the FCC
concluded that the Fairness Doctrine contravenes the First Amend-
ment and thereby disserves the public interest. 319 In Complaint of Syracuse
Peace Council, the FCC considered whether the Fairness Doctrine ob-
ligated a television station to air opposing viewpoints after the broad-
caster aired a series of editorials advocating the construction of a
nuclear power plant. 32° The FCC reasoned that the Fairness Doctrine
inhibits broadcasters from covering controversial issues because to do
so opens the broadcaster to litigation.32 ' The FCC therefore concluded
that enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine was no longer in the public
in terest. 322
In 1989, in Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the FCC's
iced by this chapter ..., the Commission may order such person to cease and desist
from such action.
Id. § 312(h). In Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit noted that the power to issue cease and desist orders represented the FCC's
ability to continue to impose an obligation on a licensee to operate in the public interest after
the issuance of the license. 867 F.2d 654, 658 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
313 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(d).
314 See id. §§ 309(e), 312(d).
313 See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981); National Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 658.
316 See supra notes 185-209 and accompanying text.
517 See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987).
313
 See Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 669.
419 2 F.C.C.R. at 5057.
12(1 1d. at 5044.
121 Id. at 5049, 5052.
322 Id. at 5052.
May 1997]	 MEDIA MERGERS	 533
decision not to enforce the Fairness Doctrine.323 The court reasoned
that the FCC's decision reflected the agency's policy judgment which
was entitled to substantial judicial deference. 324 The court thus con-
cluded that the FCC's decision that the Fairness Doctrine no longer
served the public interest was neither arbitrary, capricious nor an
abuse of discretion."' Because the FCC's determination that the Fair-
ness Doctrine was no longer in the public interest was rational, the
court did not consider the constitutionality of the doctrine itself."' The
court thus held that the FCC acted within its discretion in ceasing
enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine.321 Therefore, the Supreme Court's
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC ruling that the Fairness Doctrine is
constitutional is still good law, even though the FCC has declined to
enforce the doctrine because the FCC believes the doctrine disserves
the public interest."'
B. KEG
The FTC's power to seek an injunction for behavior that violates
the FTC Act continues after a merger has been consummated. 329 Simi-
larly, the FTC may issue cease and desist orders after a merger has been
completed."' For example, in FTG v. Ketypei & Bro., the FTC issued a
cease and desist order forbidding candy manufacturers from selling
candy packaged in a certain manner to children."' In FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., the FTC issued a cease and desist order forbidding
trading stamp manufacturers from attempting to suppress the opera-
tion of trading stamp exchanges. 332
 Although couched in the injunc-
tion or "cease and desist" terminology, FTC orders may require one
company to divest itself of another company. 333
 As with actions taken
before a merger, the courts will only interfere with such orders if they
323 867 F.2d at 669.
324 Id. at 660.
325 Id. at 669.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969); Syracuse Peace Council, 867
F.2d at 669; Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C,R. at 5057.
529 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 (1966).
33° See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
331 291 U.S. 304, 306 (1934). For a full discussion of Keppei, see supra notes 105-16 and
accompanying text.
532
 405 U.S. 233, 234 (1972), For a full discussion of Sperry, see supra notes 117-29 and
accompanying text.
333 See Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 606 n.4 (noting that FTC can order divestiture of company).
534	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 38:497
bear no reasonable relation to the activity that the FTC hopes to
proscribe. 334
V. ACTIONS THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES SHOULD TAKE
As the Supreme Court recognized in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, the dissemination of information concerning public affairs
is protected by the First Amendment regardless of the source of the
speech."' The FCC's decision in In re Complaints concerning Network
Coverage of the Democratic National Convention expressed the view that
in a democracy, the Government does not have the right to determine
how information regarding public affairs should be expressed."' The
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that in
regard to broadcast outlets, the right to speak freely is not absolute."'
Rather, as the decisions in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States make clear, courts have recog-
nized that broadcast outlet owners act as trustees for the public and
have thus carved out an exception to the protection of free expression
for broadcast outlets and placed limitations on broadcasters in ex-
change for the grant of a license."
Courts, however, have the right to review those limitations, and in
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the United States Supreme
Court stated that in order for the Court to uphold a restriction on
broadcast outlets, the Government must have a valid reason for imple-
menting the restriction."9
 Although the Government need not articu-
late a compelling interest for mandating the restriction, it must have
a substantial governmental goal and the restriction must be narrowly
tailored to further that goal.m°
Maintaining a diversity of voices qualifies as a substantial govern-
mental goal.34 ' Both the legislature and judiciary have recognized so-
ciety's need for various information sources.'42
 Given the number of
outlets owned by the corporations and networks involved in today's
media mergers, the public has good cause to be wary of such conglom-
551 See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946).
555 435 U.S. 765, 776-77, 784 (1978).
556 See Complaints concerning Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16
F.C.C.2d 650, 650, 654 (1969).
337 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
358 See id. at 389; National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
539 458 U.S. 364, 375-76, 380 (1984).
MO See id. at 376, 380,
341 See supra notes 237-74 and accompanying text.
542 See supra notes 237-74 and accompanying text.
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erates. The Government therefore satisfies a substantial governmental
interest by monitoring such conglomerates carefully.
Both the FCC and the FTC can condition the acquisition of a
network by a corporation so as to ensure that the merger comports
with the public interest." 49
 For example, in the case of the ABC/Disney
merger, the FCC conditioned its approval of the deal on Disney's
promise to sell, within a year, newspaper or radio interests in Fort
Worth and Detroit as well as a television station in Los Angeles.TM 4
 In
the case of CBS and Westinghouse, the FCC considered conditioning
the merger on a requirement that Westinghouse television stations air
at least three hours of children's educational programming each week. 345
Although the FCC, by a vote of 3-2, decided not to take such action
when concerns arose that such a requirement would violate First Amend-
ment free speech rights, the FCC's consideration of the restriction
demonstrates the broad power that the FCC wields in structuring
media mergers. 346
The FTC has not yet asserted jurisdiction in the case of corporate
takeovers of television networks because the Antitrust Division super-
vised previous acquisitions of networks." 47
 The Antitrust Division author-
ized the GE takeover of RCA and NBC in 1986, 348
 The Antitrust Division
likewise reviewed the ABC/Disney and CBS/Westinghouse mergers." 49
The differing determinations by the FCC in the ABC and CBS
cases reflect the problem that lies at the heart of the FCC's interaction
with the networks: in regulating activities of the networks, the FCC acts
solely where there is a violation of an established rule or regulation." 5°
In the ABC/Disney situation, cross-ownership of diverse media outlets
would have violated FCC ownership rules and thus the FCC required
divestiture of media interests.'" In regard to the CBS/Westinghouse
513 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(b) (1994); 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1988); FTC v. Sperry and Hutchin-
son Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
344 See Karr & King, supra note 28, at R13. See supra notes 33 and 35 for details on these
agreements.
345 See Karr, supra note 2, at B5.
316
 See id.; Commissioners, Hundt Argue Over Kid TV in Westinghouse Purchase of CBS, COMM.
DAILY, Nov. 16, 1995, available in WESTLAW, News/Topical News Library, Broadcasting Media
File. Westinghouse did, however, voluntarily agree to air more educational programming for
children. See Karr, supra note 2, at B5.
347 See. Roll, supra note 130, at 2075; Karr, supra note 2, at B5; King & Gruley, supra note 35,
at B9; Johnnie L. Roberts & Peter W. Barnes, RCA Holders Clear $6.28 Billion Sale to GE; NBC
Radio Unit May Be Sold, WALI, Sr. J., Feb. 14, 1986, at 5.
348 See Roberts & Barnes, supra note 347, at 5.
34•  See Karr, supra note 2, at B5; King & Grulcy. supra note 35, at B9.
151)
 See Hearing Before Subcomm., supra note 253, at 69 (statements of Chairman Fowler),
351 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b), (d) (1995); Karr & King, supra note 28, at B13.
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situation, the FCC has not promulgated regulations requiring educa-
tional programming. Therefore, the FCC seemed to reason, there was
no need to condition the merger on the provision of such program-
ming."' It is worth noting that two of the United States Supreme Court
decisions that recognized the power of the FCC to constrain the free
speech rights of broadcasters, National Broadcasting and Red Lion,
involved FCC enforcement of specific regulations. 353 The history of the
FCC's actions indicates that the FCC acts only where there has been a
violation of a specific regulation. 354
There are two problems with the FCC's heavy reliance on specific
regulations. First, the FCC's mandate is not a narrow one, confined to
enforcing the FCC's rules and regulations; rather, it is a broad-based
mandate to provide for the "public interest, convenience or neces-
sity."355 A view that the FCC may only enforce narrow regulations does
not allow for the creativity and flexibility necessary for monitoring the
constantly changing communications industry. Second, the passage of
the Telecommunications Act places the existence of the current regu-
lations in jeopardy and does not bode well for future regulation."6 The
Telecommunications Act eliminates the prohibition on the number of
television stations a single party can own. 357 The Telecommunications
Act also increases the national audience reach limitation to thirty-five
percent. 358 Additionally, the Telecommunications Act instructs the FCC
to conduct hearings on whether the FCC should retain its limitations
on the number of stations that a party may control within the same
television market."' Finally, in the spirit of the Telecommunications
Act, members of the FCC have indicated that the FCC may, under its
own impetus, revoke some of its cross-ownership restrictions. 38° If spe-
cific regulations are the only means by which the FCC can monitor the
broadcast industry, the Telecommunications Act's relaxation, if not
352 See Karr, supra note 2, at 85.
353 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 869-70,400-01 (enforcing Fairness Doctrine); National Broad.,
319 U.S. at 193,198,227 (enforcing eight regulations governing relations between networks and
broadcast stations).
3" See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-75; National Broad., 319 U.S. at 193. See supra note
253 for former FCC Chairman Fowler's expression of this view.
355 See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1988).
356 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(110 Stat.) 56,111.
357 	§ 202 (c) (I) (A).
358 /d. § 202(c) (1)(13).
559 Id. § 202(c) (2).
5''° See Karr Sc King, supra note 28, at 813.
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outright elimination, of those rules eliminates the FCC's ability to
ensure a diversity of voices.S61
Suggestions to ensure a diversity of viewpoints have generally
centered on regulation. 3t Some individuals have suggested that Con-
gress codify the Fairness Doctrine into law in order to ensure that the
public has access to various points of view. 363
 Such regulatory schemes,
while facially desirable in expanding the knowledge of the public
through various sources, ultimately fail because they do not address
the underlying tension between a broadcaster's free speech rights and
the Government's power to issue licenses." 4 As League of Women Voters
makes clear, courts are wary of governmental intrusion into public
affairs programming decisions made by broadcast media outlets. 365 For
the most part, such regulatory schemes represent the type of imper-
missible content regulation that League of Women Voters prohibits be-
cause it calls for broadcasters to take an active part in scheduling
specific forms of public affairs programming.'''[' Furthermore, such
proposals do not have much chance of success in the political environ-
ment that spawned the deregulatory Telecommunications Act.
361 See Hearing Before Subcomm., supra note 253, at 69 (exchange between Chairman Fowler
and Rep. Bryant).
362 See, e.g., Rainey, supra note 138, at 331-35. For example, Profinsor Rainey suggests a
three-part regulatory structure to ensure that the media serve the democratic process. Id. First,
media companies should make available information necessary for the making of informed
political judgments. See id. at 331-32. To that end, the media could schedule increased coverage
of candidates and ballot issues during the campaign cycle and reports on topics of public interest
during other periods. See id. at 332. Second, the media could contribute to the general political
knowledge of the public by producing programs that educate viewers on the operation of various
democratic processes. See id. Third, the media should broadcast public fbrurns much like those
made popular during the 1992 presidential campaign. See id. at 332-33. Such public affairs
programming would serve to educate the electorate, increase public discourse and promote a
sense of unity among the public. See id. at 335-35. Because of the intrusiveness of FCC monitor-
ing, Professor Rainey suggests that compliance should only be reviewed during license renewal
procedures. Id. at 349.
363
 See id. at 351; Kim McAvoy, Who's to Blame for Cable Rereg Mess' (Cable Television Regula-
tions), BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 4, 1993, at 60 (quoting Rep. Markey as being committed to
"putting fairness back on the books").
364
 See supra notes 136-274 and accompanying text. For a view that such schemes du ade-
quately address the tension, see Rainey, supra note 138, at 336-51 (arguing that (1) broadcast
license gives rise to regulable fiduciary duty to preserve the public trust; (2) current licensing
regime, in which only certain parties gain licenses, necessitates substantive public rights duties;
(3) nothing in First Amendment prohibits Congress from legislating to diversify speech; and (4)
public interest obligations are constitutional condition of electronic speech).
365 See League of Women Voters of Cal. v. FCC, 468 U.S. 364,380 (1984).
566 See id.; Rainey, supra note 138, at 331-35.
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Indeed, attempts to codify the Fairness Doctrine have not been
successful. 367
 Although it was long presumed that a Democratic admini-
stration would move to codify the Fairness Doctrine, recent events in
Washington, discussed above, indicate that neither Congress, the Presi-
dent nor the FCC is likely to impose a fairness obligation on the media
industry anytime soon. 368 Other attempts to promulgate more regula-
tion will probably face similar opposition. 369
Recognizing the reality that the current atmosphere in Washing-
ton militates against more regulation of the broadcast industry, any
attempt to ensure a diversity of voices should not be in the form of
more regulation. Congress should, however, stress the importance it
places on networks maintaining a marketplace of ideas. Three sugges-
tions would make that policy clear without expanding the scope of the
Government's authority to restrict broadcasters' free speech.
First, section 303 of the Communications Act, which sets forth the
powers and duties of the FCC, should be amended to provide expressly
that the FCC shall have the authority to grant licenses and pass rules
and regulations in order to ensure a diversity of information sources." )
Although such a provision would not require the FCC to act any
differently than it currently acts, the provision would codify the impor-
tance Congress places on a variety of voices. Although the FCC, Con-
gress and the courts have expressed their strong desire to maintain
diverse viewpoints in the media industry, a codification of that position
would serve to impress that ideal on those who run media outlets."71
Second, the Communications Act should be amended to require
that networks be granted licenses by the FCC. Currently, the FCC does
not license individual networks." 72
 Rather, the FCC has indirect control
over the networks through its power to grant and transfer licenses of
network-owned broadcast facilities."" The FCC can also issue regula-
tions governing relations between networks and their affiliates." 4 Some
commentators have argued that direct licensing of networks is not
necessary because these powers allow the FCC to regulate networks
367 See Adrian Cronauer, The Fairness Doctrine: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 47 Fan.
Comm. U. 51, 62 n.66 (1994); House Panel Gives Strong Support for Broadcast Fairness Legislation,
DAILY Rap. FOR EXECUTIVES, July 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Archival News File.
368 See Rod Dreher, Congress Cowers to Conservatives on Fairness Doctrine, WASH. TIMES, July
3, 1994, at A4.
369 See id.
370 See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
371 See supra notes 237-74 and accompanying text.
372 See HILLIARD, supra note 54, at 33.
m See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309, 310.
374 See id. § 303(i); National Broad„ 319 U.S. at 224.
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indirectly. 375
 Although such arguments are valid, a grant of power to
license networks directly would, like the enunciation of a clear policy
goal of ensuring diversity of voices, send a clear message that network
communications are a matter of governmental concern.
Third, the power to approve network mergers, currently shared
between the FTC and the Antitrust Division, should be explicitly granted
to the FTC alone. Currently, situations may arise in which the merger
of a network and major corporation does not implicate traditional
economic antitrust concerns."' In such situations, the Antitrust Divi-
sion, constrained as it is to consider only economic values, would
approve the merger." 7
 Nevertheless, the merger may not be in the
public interest based upon a consideration of noneconomic values."'
Unlike the Department ofjustice, the FTC, under its FTC Act mandate,
can act as a "court of equity" and disapprove a merger based on public
policy grounds.'" Placing the approval power solely with the FTC may
not ensure that public policy concerns will be decisive, but such place-
ment would at least allow such concerns to be considered. 38°
CONCLUSION
Mergers between television networks and large corporations have
resulted in the creation of large media entities that control television
stations, radio stations, newspapers and other media outlets. In a de-
mocracy, the people must have access to diverse opinions about public
affairs in order to ensure that they are making informed decisions in
the political realm. Concentration of ownership in the hands of a few
places that access in jeopardy.
Because of the role of television networks in keeping the public
informed, it is in the public interest to ensure that the owners of the
networks present varying viewpoints. Equally important in a democ-
racy, however, is the right of free expression. The Government should
neither censor opinions nor force people to say that which they do not
believe. The role of the Government in the regulation of media outlets
375 See, e.g., Lance S. Davidson, Extension of the Federal Communication Commission's jurisdic-
tion to the Television Networks, 4 Comm/ENT 235, 266
-67 (1981 -82); see also Hearing Before
Subcomm, supra note 255, at 81 (statement of Thornton F. Bradshaw, Chairman of the Board,
RCA Corporation).
975 See Pearl, supra note 5, at A10.
377 See. VAKERICS, supra note 82, § 2.03[2].
378 See. Pitofsky, supra note 132, at 1051.
375 See Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244; VAKERICS, supra note 82, § 2.03[2].
m) See. Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244; VAKERICS, supra note 82, § 2.03[2).
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is, therefore, analogous to walking a tightrope between the evils of
censorship and the evils of presenting only one view of public issues.
Three changes in the current administrative scheme would high-
light the importance of television networks' dissemination of alterna-
tive viewpoints. First, the Communications Act should be amended to
authorize explicitly the FCC to consider the public interest in a diver-
sity of broadcast voices when exercising its powers. Second, the FCC
should be given the power to license networks. Third, the power to
approve mergers between networks and other entities, currently shared
between the FTC and the Antitrust Division, should be explicitly granted
to the FTC alone.
None of these changes would present a radical change in the
current regulatory plan. Indeed, adoption of these changes may not
change the activities of the interested parties at all. Nevertheless, these
suggestions, if implemented, would send a clear signal to network
owners that the continued presentation of multiple viewpoints in pub-
lic affairs programming is of the highest societal interest.
Mike Harrington
